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A First Amendment Analysis of the

Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal
Paul Gaffneyt
The Supreme Court's landmark decision New York Times Co.
v Sullivan' recently celebrated a troubled 25th anniversary. The
case that meshed the common law of defamation with the free
speech needs of American society celebrated its silver anniversary
amid complaints it had transformed libel law into a legal morass.
A primary complaint is that the Court, through New York
Times and its progeny, has unwittingly turned libel law into a giant lottery system. Libel plaintiffs rarely win, but the successful
ones often hit a jackpot of huge damages. For libel defendants, the
protections afforded by New York Times lead to multi-million dollar legal bills. Indeed, the only libel participants who consistently
wear smiles are the lawyers who guide the parties though this highstakes game.
Additionally, the Court's libel law decisions may have made
defamation suits complex beyond the grasp of the typical jury.2
Two-thirds of jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs are revised on. appeal.3 On this evidence it is even debatable whether the current
law makes libel disputes suitable for jury trials. This is in some
sense bewildering. Defamation suits seem especially suited for jury
trial; who, other than a group of lay persons, is better suited to
evaluate damage to a person's or company's reputation?" Indeed,
t A.B. 1986, Duke University; J.D. Candidate 1991, University of Chicago.
376 US 254 (1964) ("New York Times").
2 See, for example, Stephen Brill's account of William Tavoulareas' successful 1982 libel suit against the Washington Post, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel
Trial, Am Lawyer 1 (Nov 8, 1982).
According to Brill, the jury foreman persuaded other jury members that it did not matter whether the Post's accusation against Mobil president Tavoulareas was true-that he
had "set up" his son in a tanker business serving Mobil-but only whether the Post had
proved it.
This, of course, is a complete misreading of the law of libel. The plaintiff must prove
not only that the statement was false, but also, in the case of a public figure like Tavoulareas, that it was made with at least reckless intent. Part I of this Comment contains a
more detailed discussion of these rules.
' Rodney A. Smolla, Suing the Press 77 (Oxford University Press, 1986).
' Don Reuben, Libel Law Reform That Would Chill the Working Press, Chicago Tribune C19 (Dec 12, 1988).
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the idea that juries should have a fundamental role in libel trials is
the product of the first major defamation case on American soil,
the 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger for seditious libel.
Such problems have spawned numerous, mostly academic,
proposals for reforming libel law. The most significant practical
proposal to overhaul the law is the Libel Reform Project of Northwestern University's Annenberg Washington Program ("Annenberg Proposal"). The heart of the proposal is the creation of a
no-fault, no-damages declaratory judgment proceeding for libel
disputes.
A thorough critique of the entire proposal would address a
number of complex constitutional questions. For example, under
the Annenberg Proposal, it is unlikely that libel plaintiffs would
ever recover money damages, whether or not they wanted them.
Does this unconstitutionally deny a libel victim's right to remedy?'
' See, generally, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech and Press 40 (Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund, 1955) ("The colonists had .. .learned from the sedition trials
that this essential power of the people to talk about political issues can be easily destroyed
by their rulers unless the question of punishing talk is decided by plain citizens on a jury.").
6 Proposalfor the Reform of Libel Law: The Report of the Libel Reform Project of the
Annenberg Washington Program (The Annenberg Washington Program, 1988) ("Annenberg Proposal").
' The Supreme Court has implied that Congress or the states must provide an adequate
substitute when they replace a common law recovery scheme. The roots of this doctrine are
in New York Central Railroad Co v White, 243 US 188 (1917). The Court concluded there
that New York's worker compensation system did not deny due process to injured workers,
because it was a "reasonably just substitute" for the common law cause of action an injured
worker would otherwise have against his employer. Id at 201.
The Court most recently applied this "quid pro quo" analysis in Duke Power Co. v
Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 US 59, 88 (1978), upholding a'federal damage
cap of $560 million in nuclear power accidents. The plaintiffs claimed that the law unconstitutionally limited tort victims' right to full recovery for their injuries. The Court said a
"reasonably just substitute" may not be constitutionally necessary, but nonetheless analyzed
the case on that basis. Id at 89-92.
The Court has since declined the opportunity to determine specifically whether the
Constitution's due process clauses require such a substitute. See Fein v Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal 3d 137, 695 P2d 665, cert denied, 474 US 892 (1985) (White dissenting).
Applying the quid pro quo analysis, the Annenberg Proposal is constitutionally suspect
in that it provides no "reasonably just substitute" to a large number of libel plaintiffs who
want money damages. However compelling this argument, it seems highly likely that the
Court, faced with a challenge to a statute based upon the Annenberg Proposal, would reject
this "quid pro quo" argument by initially concluding that there was a "rational basis" for
the law. Duke Power, 438 US at 82-83 (citing Usery v Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 US
1, 15 (1976)).
For an interesting study of this quid pro quo analysis in relation to medical malpractice
reform, see Note, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 Harv J Leg 143, 15155 (1981).
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Does the plan impermissibly interfere with the right to jury trial?"
Detailed analysis of these and Other questions is necessary, but beyond the scope of a single comment. Instead, this Comment will
focus on the question of whether the no-fault, no-damages declaratory judgment action created by the Proposal is consistent with the
First Amendment. This Comment will argue that while such action
poses difficult constitutional issues, the Annenberg Proposal does
not impermissibly limit the free speech guarantees of the First
Amendment. There are reasons other than constitutional ones,
however, to suggest that the Annenberg Proposal would not
achieve its goal of libel reform.
Part I of this Comment discusses problems in current libel law
and their history. Part II discusses the components of the Annenberg Proposal. Part III discusses First Amendment problems
with no-fault declaratory judgment actions. Part IV suggests drawbacks to the no-fault declaratory judgment action that do not
reach the level of constitutionality.
I.
A.

FLAWS IN CURRENT LIBEL LAW

Development of the Fault Standard

The general principles of the common law of libel are relatively simple.' Defendants were strictly liable for publication of
false and defamatory material, unless acting under privilege. °
That is, the plaintiff's reputation was the focus of the law.
' The Annenberg Proposal does not specify whether the declaratory judgment actions
could be heard before juries, although at least some panel members believe that a judge
would hear the cases. "In [the declaratory judgment action], the only question would be
whether the statement to which the plaintiff objects is true or false. After a trial, the judge
would rule on this question and state his decision.". Rodney Smolla, New Ideas in Libel; No
Cash, Just Truth, Newsday 81 (Mar 3, 1989) (emphasis added).
In state actions, however, juries are generally available for declaratory judgment proceedings so long as they were available for the action replaced. See 22A Am Jur 2d Declaratory Judgments § 228 (1988 & Supp 1990).
Similarly, federal courts have interpreted the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 USC
§§ 2201 to 2202 (1988), as preserving each party's right to a jury trial. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v Timms & Howard, Inc., 108 F2d 497, 499 (2d Cir 1939); James v
Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 349 F2d 228, 230 (DC Cir 1965).
" It is, of course, an overstatement to say that the common law tort of defamation is
simple; it is one of the most complex and difficult to understand. See Richard A. Epstein,
Charles 0. Gregory and Harry Kalven, Jr., Cases and Materials on Torts 1085 (Little,
Brown & Co., 4th ed 1985). "Relatively simple" here means that the elements of a libel case
were easier to establish when there was a no-fault standard.
" Under common law, libel defendants have an absolute privilege for reporting judicial,
legislative and executive proceedings, and thus are not liable for false statements produced
therein. Defendants also are protected by a conditional privilege when reporting certain
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Although common law libel existed at the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted, it was not adjudged constitutionally problematic until 1964, when the Supreme Court decided in New York
Times that, in suits involving public officials, strict liability for libel was inconsistent with freedom of the press.11 New York Times
was largely driven by its attendant historical circumstances, the
civil rights turmoil of the early 1960s. 12 The Times had printed an
advertisement, highly critical of Alabama public officials, that contained some relatively minor inaccuracies. Sullivan, the Montgomery police commissioner, sued and won a $500,000 verdict. The
Court overturned the verdict-and centuries of defamation tort
law. It held that a public official could not recover libel damages
unless he or she proved the defendant had acted with "actual malice," that is, with knowledge of the falsity of the statement or with
reckless disregard for whether or not it was true."3
In several cases during the following decade, the Court considered what categories of plaintiffs would have to meet this new burden of proof.1' In 1974, in Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 5 the Court
completed its break with the strict liability scheme of common law
defamation. It held that the First Amendment prohibited all strict
liability libel law, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a public
figure or a private citizen. From then on, all libel plaintiffs would
have to prove negligence, or worse, in addition to falsity. This
Comment will focus on New York Times and Gertz as the most
significant cases; these decisions shifted the focus of libel trials
from the truth of the statement to the defendant's state of mind.
The Annenberg Proposal is designed to return the focus of libel
law to its original place, the veracity of the statement.
The Court's decisions in New York Times and Gertz were motivated by a concern that large damage awards would cause selfmatters, for example, matters printed in defense their own interests. Plaintiffs can overcome
these conditional privileges by proving fault on the part of defendants. W. Page Keeton,
Prosser and Keeton on Torts §§ 114, 115 at 815-38 (West, 5th ed 1984).
" 376 US at 279-80.
1" Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 S Ct Rev 191, 200.
" New York Times, 376 US at 279-80.
"4 See Curtis Publishing Co. v Butts and Associated Press v Walker, 388 US 130, 13435 (1967) (applying the New York Times standard to those "persons who are not public
officials but who are 'public figures' and involved in issues in which the public has a justified
and important interest"); and Rosenbloom v Metromedia,Inc., 403 US 29, 43 (1971) (plurality argued that the subject matter of the alleged libel, and not the status of the plaintiff,
should be the key to whether New York Times applies; this argument was rejected three
years later in Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 323-43 (1974)).
15 418 US at 347.
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censorship within the media. Fearful of deterring the rigorous news
reporting it considered essential to a free society, the Court opted
against punishing publishers or broadcasters who made good-faith
efforts at veracity. 16 In New York Times, for example, the Times
lost a half-million dollar judgment to a public official not even
named in the advertisement. Similarly "defamed" public officials
had sued on the same ad, and the paper Was facing another $2
million in additional verdicts. 7 These awards would likely have
put the Times out of business, while threatening the same to other
papers reporting the civil rights struggle.' 8 The Court was no doubt
determined to prevent this from happening.
The freedoms the press won in New York Times were arguably attributable more to the Court's wish to see the South on the
losing end of the civil rights movement than to a consensus that
the common law of strict liability libel was fundamentally and generally flawed. 9 Yet however "results-oriented" New York Times
was, its underlying rationale endured. In Gertz, the Court corrected the "flaws" of strict liability libel with respect to private
plaintiffs as well, despite a much less sympathetic defendant than
the Times. There, the defendant, publisher of a John Birch Society
newsletter, labeled the plaintiff, a civil rights lawyer, a "Leninist"
and a "Communist-fronter." °
B. Problems Created by the Fault Standard
New York Times was heralded as opening a new era of press
freedoms. 2 Twenty-five years later critics began to claim that, far
from a judicial masterpiece, the Court created a monster.22 The
Annenberg Panel is not the first group to call current libel law a
failure, but is merely the latest in a long chorus. The problem,
"ONew York Times, 376 US at 278 ("[Tjhe pall of fear and timidity imposed upon
those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive."). See also Gertz, 418 US at 347.
'" New York Tirmes, 376 US at 278 n 18.
,"Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its
ProperPlace, 101 Harv L Rev 1287, 1289 (1988).
",See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U Chi L Rev
782, 787 (1986) ("The desire to reach the right result in New York Times had as much to do
with the clear and overpowering sense of equities arising from the confrontation over racial
questions as it did with any strong sense of the fine points of the law of defamation.").
"0 Gertz, 418 US at 326.
" Kalven, 1964 Sup Ct Rev at 221 n 125 (cited in note 12) (relaying First Amendment
scholar Alexander Meiklejohn's reaction to New York Times: "'It is,' he said, 'an occasion
for dancing in the streets.' ").
" See sources cited in note 36.
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most critics agree, is that libel suits now center, not on the veracity
of the statement, but on the defendants' state of mind when it was
made.2 The prosecution and defense of libel suits under this regime is much more expensive than where the truth of the statement is the sole issue. There remains a strong incentive, however,
to sue despite these high costs and the high burden imposed by the
fault standard. Although plaintiffs rarely win,"' those who do win
big. According to one study of cases ending in 1984, the average
jury award to victorious plaintiffs is roughly $80,000.25 A sizeable
damage award could shut down all but the wealthiest media outlets.2 Additionally, these big payoffs no doubt encourage others
who feel defamed to hire an attorney on contingent fee27 to file a
28
big-money lawsuit.
Thus the current system is one, critics say, in which neither
plaintiffs nor defendants can call themselves winners. An oft-cited
example of this is Sharon v Time, Inc.2" In 1984, Time magazine
reported that Sharon, who was at the time Israel's defense minister, had approved the 1982 massacre of Palestinians in a Beirut
refugee camp. Sharon sued for $50 million. In an unusual move,
the trial judge instructed the jury to return a special verdict. The
jury determined that Time's report was false and defamatory, but
that Sharon had failed to prove actual malice. For all his time and
money, not to mention his proof that Time badly defamed him,
Sharon came up empty-handed-but claimed vindication nonetheless. Time came up with an equally weak claim to victory, spending

23 According to one study, nearly 90 percent of libel suits turn on the issue of negligence or malice. John Soloski, The Study and the Libel Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel?, 71
Iowa L Rev 217, 218 (1985). Soloski and two other researchers later published the results of
this study in a book. See Randall P. Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg and John Soloski, Libel
Law and the Press: Myth and Reality (The Free Press, 1987) ("Iowa Study").
" In the Iowa Study survey group, media defendants were ultimately successful in 83
percent of all libel suits finally resolved. Iowa Study at 127.
6 Id at 153.
26 See Green v Alton Telegraph PrintingCo., 107 11 App 3d 755, 438 NE2d 203 (1982),

in which a small paper filed for bankruptcy when faced with a $9.2 million libel verdict.
Amazingly, the libel occurred in an internal memorandum and not on the pages of the
newspaper.
17 Approximately 80 percent of libel plaintiffs have attorneys working on a contingency
fee basis. Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 Iowa L Rev 226, 228 (1985).
28 Lois G. Forer, A Chilling Effect: The Mounting Threat of Libel and Invasion of
Privacy Actions to the First Amendment 37 (Norton, 1987). Judge Forer was an Annenberg
panelist.
2 Various motions made during this jury trial are reported at 575 F Supp 1162 (SDNY
1983); 599 F Supp 538 (SDNY 1984); and 609 F Supp 1291 (SDNY 1984).
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millions on its defense and suffering the embarrassing exposure of
its shoddy reporting and editing procedures."
Citing cases such as Sharon, critics of current libel law, including the Annenberg panel, argued that libel cases should be less
about money-multi-million-dollar legal bills and damage verdicts-and more about injured reputations. Specifically, they argue
that libel plaintiffs are far more interested in a judicial determination that they were defamed than in winning money damages. This
presumption is the thesis of the Iowa Libel Research Project, an
extensive study of libel and privacy suits filed between 1974 and
1984.31
The Iowa Study was based on interviews with libel plaintiffs
and media defendants as well as surveys of newspapers. Only 21.9
percent of the libel plaintiffs interviewed said they were interested
in winning money damages; the others said they only wanted their
reputations restored (30 percent), to deter publication of similar
stories in the future (18.7 percent), or punish or take revenge on
the defendant (29.4 percent).2 Needless to say, some commentators are skeptical of the study's conclusion that libel plaintiffs are
generally disinterested in money damages. 3 The Annenberg panel,
however, was convinced that libel plaintiffs as a group would prefer
the brevity, economy and easier burden of proof of a no-fault, nodamages declaratory judgment action.

II.

THE COMPONENTS OF THE ANNENBERG PROPOSAL

The Annenberg Proposal is the result of the Libel Reform
Project at Northwestern University. The eleven-member panel'
So

For one account of the trial, see Smolla, Suing the Press at 80-99 (cited in note 3).
Iowa Study (cited in note 23).

Id at 79.
For example, according to Forer, "[iut requires a suspension of common sense and
experience to conclude that a plaintiff who paid substantial legal fees and other expenses
would be satisfied with a mere declaration of virtue and no monetary balm." Forer, The
Chilling Effect at 327 (cited in note 28).
Libel lawyer Floyd Abrams has expressed similar sentiments: "I recall a statement by
the former head of a network news organization. 'When they say it's not the money,' he said,
'it's the money.'" Libel Law and the First Amendment, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 14 (1985) ("Libel Law Hearings").
", On the panel were Rodney A. Smolla; James Gould Cutler, Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law; Sandra S. Baron, managing general attorney, law department,
National Broadcasting Company; Bruce E. Fein, former general counsel to the Federal Communications Commission; Lois G. Forer, former judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia; Samuel E. Klein, partner, Kohn, Savett, Klein & Graf, Philadelphia; Anthony Lewis,
33
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released a libel reform study and accompanying model statute in
October 1988. Its guiding hypothesis was that modern libel law
does not work: "Libel suits tend to drag on interminably, are enormously costly for both sides and very seldom clearly resolve what
ought to be the heart of the matter: the truth or falsity of what was
published. ' 's3 Although largely an amalgamation of libel reforms
proposed throughout the 1980s,11 the Annenberg Proposal has received the most public attention. 7 The report has already had
some impact: its model statute was introduced as a bill in the Connecticut legislature in early 1989.'a And the California Supreme
Court cited the proposal in a recent case as indicative of public
sentiment for libel reform. 9
The proposal has three stages. The first requires the alleged
libel victim to request within 30 days of publication a retraction or
an opportunity to reply. This request is a prerequisite to any suit."'
The defendant can bar any legal action by complying with the request, an option currently unavailable in any state.,1 Retractions

columnist, New York Times; Roslyn A. Mazer, partner, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, D.C.; Chad E. Milton, assistant general counsel, Media/Professional Insurance, Inc.;
Anthony S. Murry, attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington,
D.C.; Herbert Schmertz, president, The Schmertz Company; and Richard M. Schmidt, Jr.,
partner, Cohn & Marks, Washington, D.C. Annenberg Proposal at 26-32 (cited in note 6).
" Id at 7.
36 See, for example, David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 Cal L Rev 847 (1986) (Barrett's article was a defense of a 1985 bill, HR 2846,
99th Cong, 1st Sess 85 (1985), introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Charles
Shumer (D-NY). The bill died in committee.); Geoffrey C. Cook, Reconciling the First
Amendment with the Individual's Reputation: The DeclaratoryJudgment as an Option to
Libel Suits, 93 Dickinson L Rev 265 (1989); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment
Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 Cal L Rev 809 (1986); James H. Hulme, Vindicating
Reputation:An Alternative to Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, 30 Am U L Rev 375
(1981); Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its
Proper Place, 101 Harv L Rev 1287 (1988); Donald L. Magnetti, "In the End, Truth Will
Out"..
Or Will It?, 52 Mo L Rev 299 (1987).
17 See, for example, Albert Scardino, Panel Backs Libel Law Shift, New York Times
C24 (Oct 18, 1988); Eleanor Randolph, Study Urges Law Be Changed To Reduce Libel
Litigation; Suits Would Be Barred Under Some Conditions, Washington Post A2 (Oct 19,
1988); Robert L. Kierstead, Overhauling the Libel System, Boston Globe 18 (Nov 28, 1988).
" See Act Concerning Libel Reform, HR-5932, Conn Gen Assembly, 1989 Sess. The
bill, introduced by Rep. Richard Tulisano, died in committee.
" See Brown v Kelly Broadcasting Company, 48 Cal 3d 711, 257 Cal Rptr 708, 725
(1989).
,o Annenberg Proposal at 15-16 (cited in note 6).
"' Thirty-three states have some sort of retraction statute on their books, generally providing for mitigation of damages if there is a retraction or reply. No state has a statute that
permits a retraction or reply to bar a plaintiff's suit. Bruce W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy:
The Prevention and Defense of Litigation §§ 12.3.1 to 12.3.4 (Prentice Hall, 1985 & Supp
1987).
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and replies must be reasonably calculated to reach the same audience as did the alleged libel."2
The proposal's second stage accounts for the most substantive
reform. Should the retraction/reply stage fail and a suit be filed,
either the plaintiff or defendant can unilaterally force the suit into
a no-fault, no-damages declaratory judgment proceeding, where
the only issue is whether the statement was true or false. 3 The
loser of this action pays only the winner's attorney fees." Also, a
losing defendant is under no obligation to print the result.
The third stage allows a traditional suit for damages in the
unlikely event that a defendant agrees to that kind of liability exposure. Here, too, the proposal works significant reforms. Punitive
damages would be eliminated, and the plaintiff would be awarded
only actual damages. 45 Finally, the proposal broadens the types of
privileged material which can be printed or broadcast without fear
of being sued. 6
III.

THE ANNENBERG PROPOSAL IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. The No-Fault Declaratory Judgment Action Reduces the
Chilling Effect of Libel Damage Awards
On its face, the no-fault declaratory judgment action appears
unconstitutional. New York Times and Gertz established the rule
that, under the First Amendment, no plaintiff may win a libel case
against the media without showing that the defendant acted negligently or worse. The Annenberg Proposal, by creating no-fault declaratory judgment actions, appears not to follow this rule. A more
detailed analysis, however, shows that the initial observation of unconstitutionality is misplaced.
The Annenberg panelists and others who support similar declaratory judgment schemes argue primarily that the elimination of
42

Annenberg Proposal at 16.

"' Id at 11.
" Id at 18.
" Id at 17.
" See note 10 for a discussion of common law reporting privileges. The Annenberg Proposal maintains the absolute privilege for reporting official matters and includes as well a
broad "neutral reportage" privilege that prevents any action when the statement involves
"matters of public interest or concern made by persons or entities other than the defendant
if the persons or entities who made the statements are identified and the statements are
accurately reported." Annenberg Proposal at 17.
The Annenberg Proposal also eliminates the common law conditional privileges in declaratory judgment actions, because they would require a showing of fault. Id.
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libel damages would eliminate the "chilling effect" that inspiredthe creation of the fault standard. 7 That is, if plaintiffs give up
any claim for damages and ask only for a judicial determination of
truth, defendants no longer need the protection New York Times
and Gertz provide from crushing damage verdicts. This, the proponents argue, is what libel plaintiffs want in the first place.' 8
A possible objection to this argument is that the Annenberg
Proposal underestimates the "chilling effect" of libel defendants'
legal bills. Under the current system, legal fees account for 80 percent of defendants' libel costs; damage awards and incidental expenses comprise the remaining 20 percent.4 9 Moreover, libel defense costs have skyrocketed. By one account, the cost of the
average suit has risen from about $20,000 in the 1970s to as high as
$250,000 in the mid-1980s5 0 Legal costs in individual suits may
have gone as high as $10 million, a chilling sum even if the defendant ultimately prevails.5 1
Whether a [libel] suit is settled; won, or lost, the legal
fees alone can be chilling. From the media's perspective,
the "big chill" in libel litigation comes more from legal
fees than from jury verdicts-for most jury verdicts are
overturned on appeal, while the legal bills come
anyway. 2
Indeed, the chilling effect of legal fees alone was part of the
Court's rationale in New York Times for eliminating strict liability
for the defamation of public officials. 3 It is inaccurate, then, to
isolate damage verdicts as the sole component of the "chilling effect" of libel suits.
It is not clear, however, what effect the Annenberg Proposal
would have on libel defense bills. Certainly, the cost per case would
Annenberg Proposalat 9-10; Franklin, 74 Cal L Rev at 820 (cited in note 36); Leval,
101 Harv L Rev at 1289-90 (cited in note 18).
41 See text accompanying note 31.
Smolla, Suing the'Press at 75 (cited in note 3).
80 Forer, A' Chilling Effect at 30 (cited in note 28).
Smolla, Suing the Press at 75 (referring to CBS's bills in its suit against William
Westmoreland, the American general who directed the Vietnam War. Westmoreland
claimed he had been defamed in a "60 Minutes" story. The case settled before trial when
Westmoreland's legal team ran out of money.).
" Id at 74.

"s "Under such a rule [of strict liability for libel with only the defense of truth], wouldbe critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." New York Times, 376 US at 279
(emphasis added).
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decline. The declaratory judgment action would be less complex
than the standard libel trial, because proving fault is the most significant and burdensome requirement of current libel law."' Exactly how much cheaper the Annenberg Proposal would make libel
actions would vary from case to case. In some cases, the truth or
falsity of the alleged libel would be a simple question. Similarly,
some publishers may decline a vigorous defense absent the threat
of a large damage verdict. In other cases, however, truth may be an
extremely elusive, and thus costly, determination.
By lowering the cost of bringing a case and making it easier
for plaintiffs to win, the declaratory judgment libel scheme might
encourage more plaintiffs to sue. Therefore, any libel savings resulting from simpler trials might be partially offset, on aggregate,
by the cost of defending a greater number of cases. The absence of
any empirical evidence renders it unclear whether the aggregate
libel defense bill will be lower, higher or the same. Certainly any
libel reforms that impose costs-on libel defendants exceeding those
under the current system could make the press even more gun-shy,
and would thus be constitutionally suspect.
Despite the changes that would undoubtedly occur in the allocation of expenses for libel suits, it seems likely that the no-fault
declaratory judgment action would reduce the overall chilling effect about which the New York Times court was concerned. The
argument here is that the chilling effect of libel law correlates with
the cost per case of libel suits and not with aggregate libel costs.
That is, the chilling effect of libel law is not measured by how
much libel defendants spend each year defending suits and, in
some cases, paying judgments; instead, the chilling effect is measured by the way the law affects individual editorial decisions. Libel lawyer Floyd Abrams gave a similar analysis to a Congressional
committee in 1985. When asked to describe how current libel law
chills the media, Abrams responded "[f]or the truth, I would say, is
that far too often stories are killed because they aren't 'really good
enough' when those words really mean 'not really good enough in
light of the legal risks.' That is the problem caused by libel law
'
today."55
According to the Iowa Study, 87.5 percent of libel suits focus on fault; only in the
remaining 12.5 percent is the primary focus on truth and defamation. Iowa Study at 125
(cited in note 23). The authors of the study estimated that the fault standard required
under New York Times and Gertz has reduced libel plaintiffs' success rates by as much as
50 percent. Id at 122-23.
" Libel Law Hearings at 21 (cited in note 33).
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Under either current law or the Annenberg Proposal, editorial
decisions must consider, among other things, what it would cost
were the story at issue to cause a libel suit. Currently, these defense costs are legal fees plus a possible verdict. Today, both are
extraordinarily high. Under a system of no-fault, no-damages declaratory judgments, the cost per case would be greatly reduced.
There would be no danger of a large verdict, and the cost of defending each case would, except in a small number of cases, be less
because fault would not be an issue. Thus, under the Annenberg
Proposal, the potential cost of each decision is greatly reduced; in
simple terms, each editorial slip-up will cost less than it would
under the current system. This, presumably, would make editors
and publishers less fearful of publishing stories-exactly the principle of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public discourse espoused in New York Times.56 Therefore, this argument goes, even
if the aggregate libel defense bill remained the same or increased
under the Annenberg Proposal, there would be an offsetting increase in press freedom resulting from the decreased monetary risk
that would accompany each decision.
Proponents of declaratory judgments for libel suits also offer
default as an option for defendants who, even in the absence of
damage verdicts, would remain chilled by their own legal fees plus
those of any plaintiff who successfully proves falsity. 7 The typical
scenario involves a small-town publisher faced with a factually
complex libel action. Although confident of a conceivably defamatory story's accuracy, the publisher nonetheless cannot afford to
defend even a no-damages action. As a result, the publisher defaults by declining to print the story and perhaps explains why he
58
or she did so in an article or editorial.
Default, however, is a troublesome option. Courts and commentators have long understood that complete "truth" in news
stories is an impossible dream. A plaintiff with a grudge against a
newspaper-stemming, say, from the paper's editorial policy-could invariably find some inconsequential errors to complain
about and file one spurious suit after another. A newspaper too
poor to defend itself would be forced to default and inflict damage
to its own reputation, no matter how diligently it defended itself in
print.
"6See New York Times, 376 US at 270.
" Franklin, 74 Cal L Rev at 821 (cited in note 36); Leval, 101 Harv L Rev at 1296
(cited in note 18).
88 Franklin, 74 Cal L Rev at 821.
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A further benefit from the reduced costs of individual decisions to publish would be the reduced importance of lawyers to the
editorial process. Under the current system, lawyers have increasingly become involved in newsroom decisions as a way to nip expensive libel suits in the bud.59 This relatively recent phenomenon
would make a traditional journalist cringe, 0 as lawyers undoubtedly err on the side of caution. Again, if each editorial decision
carried less risk, there would be less need to subject stories to legal
review prior to publication, and, consequently, less editorial interference by lawyers. Although the Supreme Court has done little to
end the proliferation of newsroom lawyers, 6 ' it has nonetheless recognized that outside interference with editorial decisions can be
constitutionally troublesome.6 2
B. The No-Fault Declaratory Judgment Action Does Not Violate
the First Amendment by Increasing the Government's Role in
Determining "Truth"
The Annenberg Proposal provokes a separate First Amendment question: would declaratory judgment libel actions put the
government in a role inconsistent with traditional or modern free
press values? Specifically, when the government provides truth as
the remedy of vindication, does the government then have an unconstitutional degree of "truth-making" in the normal discourse of
society?
Initially, the Annenberg Proposal raises no constitutional
problems in this respect. After all, the trier of fact in declaratory
judgment libel actions has a duty identical to that of judges and
" Forer, A Chilling Effect at 31 (cited in note 28).
See, for example, Steve Weinberg, The Anderson File, Columbia Journalism Rev 35,
39 (Nov/Dec 1989) ("The biggest change in [Jack Anderson's] operation is one that, sadly,
puts him in the mainstream. As Anderson explained in a recent interview, every column is
now approved by lawyers before dissemination ....
Drew Pearson, who reveled when a libel
suit came along and refused to carry libel insurance, must be spinning in his grave.").
0
In fact, the Court was responsible for putting lawyers in the newsroom. In Herbert v
60

Lando, 441 US 153 (1979), the Court held that attorneys for libel plaintiffs could conduct
discovery of the editorial processes, including notes and memos, and discussions among reporters and editors, that preceded the alleged libel. Id at 175.
62 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 418 US 241, 258 (1974), where the
Court held unconstitutional a Florida law requiring newspapers that had criticized politicians to offer reply space. The Court ruled that allowing outsiders to write their own stories
would unduly interfere with the paper's editorial processes and thus would deter the media
from criticizing politicians in the first place. "Faced with penalties that would accrue to any
newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the [reply]
statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore
...political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced." Id at 257.
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juries under common law libel-to determine whether the material
statement at issue was false and defamatory. But two important
distinctions between the proposed system and the common law
force an independent constitutional evaluation of the Annenberg
Proposal.
First, one can expect a much broader use of the new system
than the- current one. 3 Although the magnitude of the caseload
under a declaratory judgment is speculative, it seems logical that,
given both the return to no-fault libel and the extent to which the
media now permeates our society, the number of suits will be much
higher than in the pre-New York Times days. Conceivably, these
declaratory judgments could become so popular as to require a sort
of small-claims court for defamation cases.
Second, there is a fundamental difference in remedies between
the proposed system and the common law of libel. Under the common law, the judge's or jury's determination of truth was a means
to a damage verdict. In contrast, the Annenberg Proposal envisions
"truth" as the end-that is, the remedy itself. Zechariah Chafee,
discussing libel reform more than 40 years ago, noted this distinction: "The law does not enforce accuracy for its own sake. It does
sometimes determine the issue of truth in damage suits for libel,
but only as an incident to the main purpose of redressing injuries
suffered by individuals."'

4

Therefore, rather than be viewed simply

as a return to the common law system, the declaratory judgment
for libel should be analyzed as a new animal. To do so requires a
consideration of what the First Amendment contemplates as a permissible role for the government. This is neither an easy task nor
one subject to conclusive determination.
The broadest-and perhaps most unworkable-free speech/
press theory is the "marketplace of ideas." Enunciated three centuries ago by John Milton,65 and most notably restated by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, this interpretation presumes that "the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." 6 Under such a theory, the Annenberg
Proposal would surely be problematic, as "truth" would not win
"' See part III.A of this Comment.
" Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 1 Government and Mass Communications: A Report from the
Commission on Freedom of the Press 139 (University of Chicago Press, 1947) (emphasis
added).
" Chafee, Freedom of Speech and Press at 32 (cited in note 5) (quoting John Milton's
Areopagitica, published in 1644: "Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth
put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.").
" Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting).
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out on its own. Instead, after going through certain legally prescribed procedures, the "truth" that triumphed would do so upon
the determination by a state organ, the courts. The "marketplace
of ideas," however, is not a complete First Amendment theory, for
there appears little dispute that society needs some protection
from false and distortive speech. 7
The question, then, is not whether the government must sit on
the sidelines, but rather the degree to which ' government may interfere with freedom of the press. Centuries of libel law are evidence that the government has a legitimate interest in accuracy or,
more specifically, in inaccuracies that harm its citizens.6 The Annenberg Proposal could be a reasonable method of regulating this
interest, much like, for example, the Federal Communications Act
is a reasonable method of keeping the airwaves uncluttered. 9
The danger in such regulations is that they give the government control over the "quality" of speech.70 The Annenberg Proposal is problematic in this respect. Truth does not lend itself to
easy determination, particularly when the means of discovering
truth is a court case. As Chafee noted, "[1]itigation can settle disputes; it cannot settle truth .... We must always be careful not to
assume that the findings of a tribunal on a controversial issue are
THE TRUTH. ' 71 A number of observers, including at least two
Annenberg panelists, have recognized the difficulty of determining

67

See, for example, C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of

Speech, 25 UCLA L Rev 964, 976 (1978) (The marketpiace theory "requires that people be
able to use their rational capacities to eliminate distortion caused by the form and frequency of message presentation. . . .This assumption cannot be accepted. Emotional or
'irrational' appeals have great impact.").
Justice Hugo Black's view, expressed in his New York Times concurrence, 376 US at
293, that there should be a bar against libel suits by critics of official conduct, has gone
nowhere. Such a position, however, is not without prominent supporters, including one Annenberg panelist. See Anthony Lewis, New York Times v Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to
Return to "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 Colum L Rev 603, 621
(1983).
" See Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 US 75, 86 (1966) ("Society has a pervasive and strong
interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation. But ... there is tension between this interest and the values nurtured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
69 See 47 USC § 151 (1988), noting the government's interest in "a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide communications system."
The unique nature of the broadcast media perhaps lends itself to-more of this type of
procedural regulation. The Court has allowed more substantive interference with the electronic media than with the traditional press. For a discussion of this issue, see William W.
Van Alstyne, Interpretationsof the First Amendment 73-77 (Duke University Press, 1984).
70 Chafee, 2 Government and Mass Communications at 678-89 (cited in note 64).
7, Chafee, 1 Government and Mass Communications at 173 (emphasis in original).
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the "truth" in some libel suits.12 Nor has the Court failed to take
notice of this problem; it recognized in New York Times that determining whether or not a news story was true was a difficult and
uneasy role for courts. 3
The question of how effectively truth can be determined is less
important than who is doing it. This is where the Annenberg Proposal is in the greatest danger of running afoul of the First Amendment. In rewriting the law of libel, the Court in New York Times
found strict liability libel suits by public officials inconsistent with
"the central meaning of the First Amendment."7' 4 Thus, whatever
its origins, 5 the First Amendment could never again tolerate
prohibitions against criticism of public officials and government
policy. 76 Even those who offer restrictive views of free speech concede that protection of political speech is the purpose of the First
Amendment.77
In line with this theory, any system where the government is
given the role of determining the official version of the "truth"
would be troublesome. A government with its hands on the controls of "truth" has at its disposal the tools to manipulate the flow
of important information. 8 In libel cases, the problem is most
acute when disputes involve public officials. The danger comes
from having the government adjudicate claims of inaccuracy made
72 Forer

has said any test of truth should demand only "substantial accuracy." Forer, A
Chilling Effect at 340 (cited in note 28). Panelist Sandra S. Baron, an NBC lawyer, said in
commentary included in the report: "Indeed, I remain skeptical that any system of libel
laws that depends on judicial determinations of the often-elusive concept of truth is preferable to leaving the resolution of public disputes to public forums." Annenberg Proposal at 27
(cited in note 6).
"[Clourts have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged
libel was true in all its factual particulars." New York Times, 376 US at 279.
71 Id at 273.
" Constitutional historian Leonard Levy has argued that the Framers never intended
the First Amendment to proscribe seditious libel, and that the doctrine of press freedoms as
protecting criticism of public officials and policy did not develop until after the passage and
retraction of the Sedition Act of 1798. "[T]here is not evidence to warrant the belief. . .that
the Framers possessed the ultimate wisdom and best insights on the meaning of freedom of
expression. What they said is far more important than what they meant." Leonard Levy,
Emergence of a Free Press 349 (Oxford University Press, 1985).
76 Kalven, 1964 Sup Ct Rev at 209 (cited in note 12) ("The touchstone of the First
Amendment has become the abolition of seditious libel and what that implies about the
function of free speech on public issues in American democracy.").
" See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind
L J 1, 20 (1971).
7'Chafee, 1 Government and Mass Communications at 12 (cited in note 64).
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by its own members.7' That is, every time such a case occurred, a
government organ-the court, and in many cases a single
judge-would decide whether a statement made by a private citizen about a government official was an acceptable version of the
truth. Such claims arise surprisingly often. In the Iowa study, 56.3
percent of all libel suits against media defendants between 1974
and 1984 were filed by public officials or public figures.8 0
The problem would be particularly troubling in a political context. An example would be a political candidate who sued for declaration of falsehood during a campaign in one of the few states
where judges are appointed."' One would certainly worry about the
pressure on a judge who was up for reappointment to favor any
plaintiff involved, directly or indirectly, with the appointment process. A similar concern would exist in states where judges are
elected 8" regarding their incentive to side either with each other or
simply against unpopular newspapers or television stations. Both
situations indicate ways in which the government could misuse its
truth-determination role.
Overall, however, the problem of "government-as-truthmaker"
may be more troubling in theory than in practice. A dangerous system of the government sitting in judgment of damaging statements
about its own members is, for several reasons, an overly dramatic
characterization of what a declaratory judgment system would produce. First, as noted earlier, the triers of fact in these cases would
either be judges or jurors, who have the role of "truth determination" in all disputes.83 Second, this monolithic depiction of government is inconsistent with our system of separated powers, where
19 Justice Louis Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v California, 274 US
357, 375 (1927), said that speech and press freedoms contemplated that the "discovery and
spread of political truth" would be the function of individuals, not the government.
'0 Iowa Study at 10 (cited in note 23).
According to 1989 figures, in seven states all or nearly all judges are appointed by the
governor or legislature: California, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
South Carolina and Virginia. The Lawyer's Almanac 1989 690-99 (Prentice Hall, 1989).
82 Thirty-two states elect some or all of their judges, in either partisan or non-partisan
elections: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Ilinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Tenessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. Id at 690-99.
81 Panel chair Rodney A. Smolla, in a recent article reiterating the arguments in favor
of the Annenberg Proposal, responded similarly to the "government-as-truthmaker" argument by noting that, carried to its logical extreme, it would unravel all existing libel law,
which at its root requires a determination of truth or falsity. Rodney A. Smolla and Michael
J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal:A Case for Enactment, 31 Wm & Mary
L Rev 25, 55 (1989).
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the different branches seem at least as likely to butt heads as to
protect each other. It is not clear, for example, that a judge would
be any more inclined to support fellow public officials than the
newspaper upon which he or she depends for popularity. Thus, the
system would be a far cry from the image of members of congress
or presidents deciding their own disputes with the media. Additionally, even if such feared decisions were to occur, their consequences would be greatly mitigated, because there would be no
damages to make the defendants feel the pain of varying from the
official version of the truth. And finally, these concerns seem to
presume a populace that cannot think for itself, that would accept
without question the results of these declaratory judgment actions.
In short, the type of "governmental truth-making" incident to declaratory judgment libel actions does not appear to be the type
central to the First Amendment.
This point is illustrated by the facts of New York Times. Assume that the advertisement was entirely correct instead of just
substantially so. Would a declaration by an Alabama judge or jury
that the Times was wrong, and Sullivan was right, without the attendant damages, have created any danger? Probably not. It seems
likely that few people, particularly the Times's normal nationwide
audience, would have believed the court. That is, Sullivan may
have been vindicated in his own eyes and in the eyes of those sympathetic with his cause, but in few eyes beyond that. Thus, the
danger of inherent to finding "political truths"-that the outcome
will reflect the individual biases of the judge or jury members,8
and that the only version of the truth will be the official
one-would exist more in theory than in practice. The decision itself would certainly not silence the media. Without the large damage verdict that accompanies decisions under current law, there
would be little danger of self-censorship.
C. The Fee-Shifting Component of the Annenberg Proposal Does
Not Impose a Damage Verdict Without Fault
The fee-shifting provision of the declaratory judgment action
raises independent constitutional questions. The preliminary question is the propriety of fee-shifting. Fee-shifting, of course, is the
exception rather than the rule in the American legal system. 5
"' Chafee, 1 Government and Mass Communications at 142 (cited in note 64).'
" In support of the American rule [against fee-shifting], it has been argued that
since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from
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Courts are generally inclined to uphold statutory fee-shifting proposals,86 which exist in a number of areas.8 7 Thus, the provision in
the Annenberg Proposal would likely be acceptable.
The Annenberg panel and proponents of similar plans contend
that fee-shifting is essential to provide libel plaintiffs and defendants the proper incentives to settle cases by retraction or reply,
and more importantly, to seek a no-fault, declaratory judgment
rather than the traditional action for damages.8 In particular, they
argue that without fee-shifting, less affluent plaintiffs may have no
remedy against libel. Under the current system, a plaintiff with a
decent case has no trouble finding a contingency-fee lawyer attracted by the potential of a big payoff.8 9 These same lawyers
would presumably not be interested if no damages were available,
although some commentators have argued that the high-profile nature of libel suits alone attracts lawyers.9 0 But generally speaking,
without reimbursement of attorneys' fees, those plaintiffs unable
to finance their own suits would essentially find themselves without any remedy.
The idea that libel plaintiffs who prefer vindication to damages should be entitled to enough money to cover legal fees is not
without prominent supporters. 1 The potential problem with fee-

instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the
fees of their opponents' counsel.
FleishmannDistilling Corp. v Maier Brewing Co., 386 US 714, 718 (1967) (citing Arcambel
v Wiseman, 3 US 306 (1796)). The Court also reasoned that litigating what are "reasonable
attorney's fees" would impose substantial burdens on the judiciary. Id. See also Hauenstein
v Lynham, 100 US 483 (1880); Stewart v Sonnenborn, 98 US 187 (1879); Oelrichs v Spain,
82 US 211 (1872); and Day v Woodworth, 54 US 363 (1851).
' Some courts even uphold provisions that permit only one party to recover, so long as
the government is compelled by a strong public policy interest. See Annotation, Validity of
Statute Allowing Attorney's Fee to Successful Claimant but Not to Defendant, or Vice
Versa, 73 ALR3d 515 (1976).
87 Fee-shifting is available, for example, under the Sherman Act, 15 USC §§ 1, 15(a)
(1988), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC §§ 78a, 78r(a) (1988), the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 USC § 201, 216(b) (1988), and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act, 42 USC § 1988 (1988).
" Franklin, 74 Cal L Rev at 821 (cited in note 36).
" See note 27.
80 Leval, 101 Harv L Rev at 1294 (cited in note 18).
See, for example, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 US 749
(1985), a commercial libel case where the Court scaled back the Gertz rule prohibiting punitive damages without a showing of actual malice, Justice White wrote in his concurrence:
In New York Times, instead of escalating the plaintiff's burden of proof to an
almost impossible level, we could have achieved our stated goal by limiting the
recoverable damages to a level that would not unduly threaten the press .... Had
that course been taken and the common-law standard of liability been retained,
the defamed public official, upon proving falsity, could at least have had a judg-
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shifting in declaratory judgment libel actions, however, is that it
would, in effect, impose a damage award on unsuccessful defendants without a showing of fault. With fee-shifting, successful libel
plaintiffs would get no compensation for their reputational injuries, but would recover legal fees "caused" by the suit. Under the
current system, legal fees can equal or exceed the damage verdict.
For example, William Tavoulareas won punitive damages against
the Washington Post that equalled the $1.8 million he spent to
92
bring his case.

The simple nature of declaratory libel judgments would
greatly lessen legal fees in most cases. Conceivably, there could be
an extremely complex case, such as the Tavoulareas suit, where
there would be no difference between making the defendant pay
the plaintiff's legal fees and making the defendant pay a typical
damage verdict. The shifting of unusually large legal fees would
most likely occur, ironically, in high-profile suits involving public
officials and public figures, the cases that inspired the Court's
press protections in the first place. Under the Annenberg system,
that money would be paid without a showing of fault. The infrequency of such a result, however, suggests that the fee-shifting aspect of the Annenberg Proposal would not likely cause constitutional problems.
IV. THE WISDOM OF THE No-FAULT DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTION

Although the no-fault declaratory judgment action of the Annenberg Proposal is consistent with the First Amendment, the wisdom of such a reform is questionable on other grounds. If the
structure of the Annenberg Proposal-in particular the retraction/
reply provision and the no-fault, no-damages declaratory judgment
action-works such a sensible compromise between plaintiff and
defendant interests, if in the end it makes both sides better off,
then why have not libel litigants worked out such a system on their
own?
This argument assumes either that declaratory judgments are
an option under the current libel law, or that libel litigants could

contract into a dispute resolution system of their choosing. Several
ment to that effect ....
He might even have recovered a modest amount, enough
perhaps to pay his litigation expenses.
Id at 771.
92 Brill, Am Lawyer at 94 (cited in note 2). The jury also awarded Tavoulareas $250,000
in compensatory damages.
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commentators have argued that this is in fact the case. 3 There is
nothing in the law of declaratory judgments that prohibits such
libel actions;94 more importantly, declaratory judgments logically
advance the "remedial objectives" of libel law." A declaration of
falsity is not only a component of the typical suit for damages, but
plaintiffs are likely to consider such a declaration a significant part
of their verdict. The common law recognized essentially this same
action. A plaintiff could sue for nominal damages in an action
"brought for the purpose of vindicating [his or her] character by a
verdict of a jury that establishes the falsity of the defamatory
matter." 96
The argument in favor of allowing the parties to contract into
a no-fault, no-damages action focuses on the defendant's interests.
As the beneficiary of libel law's constitutional protections, the defendant should be able to waive his rights at his choosing. 7
Declaratory judgments for libel, however, have not become a
generally accepted alternative to trial. Nor have defendants foregone the protections of New York Times and Gertz when plaintiffs
promise to forego any claims for damages. That the opposing parties to libel suits have retained the status quo is perhaps evidence
that the assumptions underlying the Annenberg Proposal and the
other plans-that plaintiffs would trade damages for vindication
and defendants would trade damages for anything-are misguided.
Indeed, news stories reporting on the Annenberg Proposal quoted
a number of libel "players"-including plaintiff William Westmoreland, Judge Leval, and a number of prominent defense lawyers-as saying they found the proposal's trade-offs unappealing.9

"' Leval, 101 Harv L Rev at 1288 (cited in note 18); Note, Of Things to Come-The
Actual Impact of Herbert v Lando and a Proposed National Correction Statute, 22 Harv J
Leg 441, 477 (1985); Hulme, 30 Am U L Rev at 389-90 (cited in note 36).
" The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides that federal courts "may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration, whether

or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 USC § 2201 (1988). Similarly, the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act ("UDJA"), law in 40 states, provides: "Courts of record within
their respective jurisdictions shall have the power to declare rights, status, and other legal
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." UDJA § 1, Uniform Laws
Annotated 109 (West, 1975).
" Leval, 101 Harv L Rev at 1292.
96Restatement (Second) of Torts § 620, comment a (1976).
,7Leval, 101 Harv L Rev at 1298.
See, for example, Guy Daust, 'No-fault' Libel Trials Recommended, Associated Press
(Oct 17, 1989) (quoting libel lawyer Richard N. Winfield: "If I were a publisher, I wouldn't
willingly trade constitutional protection for the illusion of some kind of expedited, low-cost
dispute resolution process."); James Warren, Westmoreland, CBS Oppose Libel Plan, Chicago Tribune C5 (Feb 14, 1989) (reporting a Northwestern University forum discussion on
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Furthermore, the no-fault declaratory judgment action, by
lowering the cost per editorial decision, reduces the deterrent effect the current system has on the more irresponsible publishers.
More simply, the Annenberg Proposal eliminates the deterrent
value that tort damages have on harmful speech. The classic example is the supermarket tabloid that, unlike more traditional news
organizations, is completely unconcerned with building a reputation for accuracy. Such a publication would be undeterred from
printing intentionally (or at least recklessly) harmful speech. 9
The Annenberg Proposal also seems to prohibit a plaintiff in
such an instance from bringing a non-libel intentional tort action.
The proposal would disallow frequently used alternative causes of
action, such as infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy, when "the real, underlying claim is that the plaintiff has
been defamed by a false statement of fact." 100 Although libel plaintiffs may prefer simple vindication to money damages,10 ' they
would no doubt prefer that the libel was never published in the
first place. That is exactly what tort damages are designed to do."0 2
Finally, one must question whether a change in the law of libel
is currently necessary. Most of the libel reforms referred to earlier l"' were written in the early and middle 1980s, the most recent
peak of high-profile libel suits includes Westmoreland, Sharon and
Tavoulareas, all of which occurred prior to 1985. Since then, the
number of libel suits filed has declined significantly, prompting
speculation that there is now a "chilling effect on potential plaintiffs.""04 In a recent article reiterating the rationale behind the Annenberg Proposal, the panel chair suggested that "the time for reform is never in the heat of the crisis, but after it, in the quiet
before the storm."' 0 5 This argument notwithstanding, the absence
the Annenberg Proposal: "Plaintiffs' lawyers and litigants, notably Westmoreland, chided
the plan for weakening their chances of winning. Defense lawyers, including CBS's George
Vrandenburg III, warned that it would make filing suits easier and dilute press protections
that make a successful libel suit a longshot.").
" For 'this reason Marc Franklin, one of the leading proponents of declaratory judgment libel actions, supports them only at the plaintiff's election: Letting defendants elect
declaratory judgments "puts the power to publish intentionally false and defamatory statements with practical impunity into the hands of all media." Franklin, 74 Cal L Rev at 845
(cited in note 36).
Annenberg Proposal at 12 (cited in note 6).
,0,See text accompanying notes 31-32.
100

,o3Chafee, 1 Government and Mass Communications at 173, 174 (cited in note 64).
103

See sources cited in note 36.

,04Albert Scardino, Libel Suits Wane, Press Study Finds, New York Times 52 (Dec 3,
1988) (reporting a 17 percent decline in libel suits against major newspapers.).
,oSmolla & Gaertner, 31 Wm & Mary L Rev at 48 (cited in note 83).
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of any obvious, pressing need for reform is probably responsible for
the early conclusions that the Annenberg Proposal would not get
enough political support to become law in the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION

The Annenberg Proposal raises interesting First Amendment
problems but none that would constitutionally derail it. The plan
seems to achieve a return to common-law, no-fault libel, and correspondingly shifts the focus of defamation back to injured reputations, without raising the problems of self-censorship that motivated the Court in New York Times and Gertz. And although it
gives the government the role of dispensing "truth" as a remedy,
the Proposal does not appear to exceed the bounds of government
involvement in freedom of the press.
Whether the reform is a wise one is a different matter. It ignores the beneficial aspects of libel damages, and rests on potentially faulty assumptions about what libel defendants and plaintiffs
may want.

